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Abstract
Research into active networking has provided the incen-
tive to re-visit what has traditionally been classified as dis-
tinct properties and characteristics of information transfer
such as protocol versus service; at a more fundamental level
this paper considers the blending of computation and com-
munication by means of complexity. The specific service
examined in this paper is network self-prediction enabled
by Active Virtual Network Management Prediction. Com-
putation/communication is analyzed via Kolmogorov Com-
plexity. The result is a mechanism to understand and im-
prove the performance of active networking and Active Vir-
tual Network Management Prediction in particular. The
Active Virtual Network Management Prediction mechanism
allows information, in various states of algorithmic and
static form, to be transported in the service of prediction
for network management. The results are generally applica-
ble to algorithmic transmission of information. Kolmogorov
Complexity is used and experimentally validated as a theory
describing the relationship among algorithmic compres-
sion, complexity, and prediction accuracy within an active
network. Finally, the paper concludes with a complexity-
based framework for Information Assurance that attempts
to take a holistic view of vulnerability analysis.
Keywords: Active Virtual Network Management Pre-
diction, Kolmogorov Complexity, Information Assurance
and Active Networks.
1. Introduction
Kolmogorov Complexity (K(x)) [14] is the optimal
compression of string x. This incomputable, yet fundamen-
tal property of information has vast implications in a wide
range of applications including system management and op-
timization [11, 12], security [3, 7], and bioinformatics. Ac-
tive networks [4] form an ideal environment in which to
study the effects of tradeoffs in algorithmic and static in-
formation representation because an active packet is con-
cerned with the efficient transport of both code and data.
A question active network application developers must an-
swer is: “How can I best leverage the capabilities that ac-
tive networks have to offer?”. Because the word “active”
in active networks refers to the ability to dynamically move
code and modify execution of components deep within the
network, this typically leads to another question: “What
is the optimal proportion of content for an active applica-
tion that should be code versus data?”. A method for ob-
taining the answer to this question comes from direct ap-
plication of Minimum Description Length (MDL) [16] to
an active packet. Let Dx be a binary string representing
x. Let Hx be a hypothesis or model, in algorithmic form,
that attempts to explain how x is formed. Later in this
paper, we view Hx as a predictor of x in the analysis of
Active Virtual Network Management Prediction. For now
let us focus on developing a measure of the complexity of
x. MDL states that the sum of the length of the shortest
encoding of a hypothesis about the model generating the
string and the length of the shortest encoding of the string
encoded by the hypothesis will estimate the Kolmogorov
Complexity of string x, K(x) = K(Hx) + K(Dx|Hx).
Note that error in the hypothesis or model must be com-
pensated within the encoding. A small hypothesis with a
large amount of error does not yield the smallest encoding,
nor does an excessively large hypothesis with little or with
no error. A method for determining K(x) can be viewed
as separating randomness from non-randomness in x by
“squeezing out” non-randomness, which is computable, and
representing the non-randomness algorithmically. The ran-
dom part of the string, i.e. the part remaining after all pat-
tern has been removed, represents pure randomness, unpre-
dictability, or simply, error. Thus, the goal is to minimize
l(He)+ l(Dx|He) + l(E) where l(x) is the length of string
x, He is the estimated hypothesis used to encode the string
(Dx) and E is the error in the hypothesis. The more ac-
curately the hypothesis describes string x and the shorter
the hypothesis, the shorter the encoding of the string. A
series of active packets carrying the same information are
measured as shown in Figure 1. Choosing an optimal pro-
portion of code and data minimizes the packet length. The
goal is to learn how to optimize the combination of com-
munication and computation enabled by an active network.
Clearly, if K(x) is estimated to be high for the transfer
of a piece of information, then the benefit of having code
within an active packet is minimal. On the other hand, if
the complexity estimate is low, then there is great poten-
tial benefit in including it in algorithmic form within the
active packet. When this algorithmic information changes
often and impacts low-level network devices, then active
networking provides the best framework for implementing
solutions (a specific example of separating non-randomness
from randomness, although not explicitly stated as such, can
be found in predictive mobility management as discussed in
[4, 15]. However, the optimization of code/data or compu-
tation/communication has an additional constraint, namely
security. Complexity also plays a significant role in the
analysis of potential vulnerability within a network as dis-
cussed later in this paper.
Figure 1. Algorithmic Content.
An active packet that has been reduced to the length of
the best estimate of the Kolmogorov Complexity of the in-
formation it transmits will be called the minimum size ac-
tive packet. When the minimum size active packet is ex-
ecuted to regenerate string x, the Dx|He portion of the
packet predicts x using static data (E) to correct for inac-
curacy in the estimated hypothesis. There are interesting
relationships among Kolmogorov Complexity, prediction,
compression and the Active Virtual Network Management
Prediction (AVNMP) mechanism described in [4]. Details
on the operation and mechanism of operation for AVNMP
can be found in papers as early as [2]. Space limitations
in this paper preclude a detailed description of operation,
however, an overview of the characteristics and properties
of AVNMP as well as new experimental results are pre-
sented and the relationships among complexity, predictabil-
ity, and compressibility and information assurance are dis-
cussed and experimentally validated throughout this paper.
The next section provides an overview of AVNMP before
discussing its relationship to Kolmogorov Complexity. Af-
ter required relevant background on AVNMP is explained,
the relationship to Complexity Theory is developed begin-
ning from a high level overview, then driving down into de-
tailed relationships and experimental results.
2. Active Virtual Network Management Pre-
diction Overview
The Active Virtual Network Management Prediction
(AVNMP)1 architecture provides a network prediction ser-
vice that utilizes the capability of active networking to inject
fine-grained models into the communication network to en-
hance network performance. Active Virtual Network Man-
agement Prediction (AVNMP) provides a network predic-
tion service designed to facilitate the management of large,
complex, active networks in a proactive manner. Network
management includes a wide variety of responsibilities in-
cluding configuration, fault, performance, accounting, and
security management. A network management system must
be able to monitor, control, and report upon the status of
all these areas. In addition, the network management sys-
tem should be more than a tool to generate reports and help
fix problems, it should have the capability to anticipate and
correct problems before they impact network performance.
AVNMP accomplishes prediction and fault anticipation us-
ing a novel coupling of concepts from distributed simula-
tion and active networking. A simple example demonstrat-
ing AVNMP results on a single node for load prediction
is shown in Figure 2. In today’s management systems, a
Management Information Base (MIB) maintains only cur-
rent state values. In AVNMP, load is predicted into the
future as real-time, called Wallclock, advances. Thus an-
ticipated future values are available on the node as well as
current values. In Figure 2, the Local Virtual Time (LVT)
(future time), runs ahead of Wallclock Time (current time).
Predicted load values are refined until Wallclock reaches
1Current project progress and experimental code is maintained in
http://www.crd.ge.com/˜bushsf/ftn.This research has been funded by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) contract F30602-
01-C-0182 and managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)
Information Directorate.
the LVT of a particular value. This capability, described
in detail in this paper, has been enabled by a new proac-
tive network management framework combining three key
enabling technologies; namely, distributed simulation, opti-
mistic synchronization, and active networks.
The predictive capability provided by AVNMP facilitates
the development of a variety of predictive applications from
mobile wireless location management and network secu-
rity to improved QoS. AVNMP provides an ideal predic-
tive service for mobile systems to predict their location [4].
Because mobile location can be predicted, hand-off situa-
tions are known ahead of time and setup for hand-off can
take place prior to the hand-off event resulting in fast hand-
off and improved QoS. In the domain of network security,
AVNMP can anticipate the progress of an attack along most
likely vulnerability paths and incorporate that information
into decision-making. An attack can be propagated through
the system before it actually occurs in order to determine
its impact. In collaboration with the United States National
Institute of Standards and Technology, AVNMP has been
demonstrated with CPU prediction models showing the sys-
tem’s ability to detect malicious active packets. Combined
with the load prediction capability of AVNMP, Denial-of-
Service attacks that use either abnormal amounts of CPU
time or large numbers of small CPU packets can be detected
and stopped [5]. With regards to QoS, the load applica-
tion previously discussed allows resources and routing to
be better managed by anticipating traffic in order to opti-
mize load distribution within the network. A few additional
selected uses for AVNMP are the ability to choose an opti-
mum management polling interval that minimizes overhead
based upon predicted rate of change and fault probability
of the monitored data in a managed entity, fault correc-
tion before the system is impacted and with time available
to perform dynamic optimization of repair parts, service,
and solution entities such as software agent or human co-
ordination and optimal resource allocation and planning not
only for load, but also for CPU utilization that becomes sig-
nificant in active networks. AVNMP allows “What if...?”
scenarios to become an integral part of the network and fi-
nally, AVNMP-enhanced components are enabled with the
ability to protect themselves by taking proactive, evasive ac-
tion, such as migrating to safe hardware before anticipated
disaster occurs.
A severe limitation of state-of-the-art network manage-
ment techniques is that they are inherently reactive. They
attempt to isolate the problem and determine solutions after
the problem has occurred. Proactive management is a nec-
essary ingredient for managing future networks. Part of the
proactive capability is provided by analyzing current perfor-
mance and predicting future performance based on likely
future events and the network’s reaction to those events.
This can be a highly dynamic, intensely computational op-
eration. This has prevented management software from in-
corporating prediction capabilities. But distributed simula-
tion techniques take advantage of parallel processing of in-
formation. If the management software can be distributed, it
is possible to perform computation in parallel and aggregate
the results to minimize computation overhead at each of the
network nodes. The usefulness of optimistic techniques has
been well documented for improving the efficiency of sim-
ulations. In optimistic logical process synchronization tech-
niques, also known as Time Warp [2], causality can be re-
laxed in order to trade model fidelity for speed. If the system
that is being simulated can be queried in real time, predic-
tion accuracy can be verified and measures taken to keep
the simulation in line with actual performance. AVNMP
is implemented in an active network to provide predictive
management of an active network. AVNMP is designed to
utilize the additional processing and flexibility of an active
network to provide better management of the added com-
plexity in processing and bandwidth in an active network.
AVNMP requires extreme network flexibility, primarily in
the ability to inject fine-grained component models into the
network. A much less flexible version of AVNMP could be
implemented in legacy systems by building dedicated net-
work component models directly into legacy network de-
vices such as today’s routers. However, these models would
be immobile and not easily updated or removed, most likely
requiring the network device to be taken down when mod-
els are changed or updated. A better mechanism for using
AVNMP to manage legacy networks would be to provide an
active network overlay capable of monitoring legacy nodes.
AVNMP should reside in the active network overlay provid-
ing a predictive management service for the legacy network.
This has the added benefit of transitioning a legacy network
to an active network.
AVNMP, injected into the network as an active applica-
tion, is capable of modeling load and propagating state in-
formation in a manner that meets the demand for accuracy
at a particular active node. Greater demand for prediction
accuracy is met at the cost of AVNMP performance, that
is, the ability of AVNMP to predict farther into the future.
While this paper focuses on network traffic and load pre-
diction, an AVNMP application to predict CPU utilization
for active network in collaboration with National Institute
of Standards and Technology [5, 9, 8] has been demon-
strated. The inherently distributed nature of communication
networks and the computational power unleashed by the ac-
tive networking paradigm have been used to mutual benefit
in the development of the Active Virtual Network Manage-
ment Prediction mechanism. The active network benefits
from AVNMP by continuously receiving information about
potential problems before they occur.
AVNMP benefits from the active network in many ways.
The first, and most practical way is the ease of develop-
Figure 2. Convergence of Prediction and Reality in the AVNMP State Queue.
ment and deployment of this novel prediction mechanism.
This could not have been accomplished so quickly or easily
given today’s closed, proprietary network device process-
ing. Another benefit is the fact that network packets now
have the unprecedented ability to control their own process-
ing. Great advantage was taken of this new capability in
AVNMP. Virtual messages, varying widely in content and
processing, can adjust their predicted values as they travel
through the network. Finally, active networks add a level of
robustness that cannot be found in today’s networks. This
robustness is due to the ability of AVNMP system compo-
nents, which are active packets, to easily migrate from one
node to another in the event of failure –or the prediction of
failure provided by AVNMP itself.
The desired characteristics of AVNMP are a large looka-
head time, high prediction accuracy, low overhead and ro-
bust operation. Each of these characteristics is inter-related
and a suitable tradeoff needs to be determined during con-
figuration of the system. The AVNMP experimental valida-
tion configuration for the initial test discussed in this paper
is a feed forward network consisting of a host containing the
Driving Process and four intermediate active network nodes
containing Logical Processes as shown in Figure 3. AH-1
and AH-2 are host nodes and AN-1 through AN-5 are ac-
tive network nodes. The edges between the nodes represent
links between the labeled ports on each node. All nodes are
Sun Sparcs running the Magician active network execution
environment. The AVNMP system parameters were con-
figured as shown in Table 1. In this experiment AVNMP
is predicting the packet input and output rate for each link
at each node, from an application residing on AH-1 that is
transmitting an active audio packets.
The State Queue plot, Figure 2, shows the predicted traf-
fic load values cached in the State Queue as a function of
Local Virtual Time (LVT) and Wallclock. As Wallclock ap-
proaches any given Local Virtual Time, the predicted load
values converge towards the actual load. The dashed line
placed diagonally across the surface highlights where pre-
dicted time and actual time converge. The general operation
is illustrated in the next five graphs where all measurements,
unless otherwise indicated, are from node AN-4. These
curves validate intuitive trends in the operation of AVNMP.
Figure 4 shows the reduction in tolerance versus time that is
pre-programmed into each Logical Process. The Y-axis is
the tolerance that is demanded between the predicted value
and the actual value of an Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) packet counter. This value is decreased
purposely in this experiment in order to create a greater de-
mand over time for accuracy and thus create a challenging
validation of the AVNMP system under gradually increas-
ing stress. In Figure 5 the proportion of out-of-tolerance
messages is shown as a function of Wallclock. The Y-axis
Figure 3. AVNMP Test Configuration.
Parameter Value
Sliding Window Lookahead Length (Λ) 200 seconds
Virtual Message Generation Rate 0.5 virtual messages/millisecond
Virtual Message Prediction Step Size 20 seconds
Tolerance for Prediction Error (θ) 500 Messages/second
Virtual Real Message Ratio 1 virtual/real message
Load Hypothesis (He) Linear Extrapolation
Table 1. AVNMP Test Parameters.
is the proportion of messages that arrived at a specific node
out of tolerance, that is, the actual value exceeded the pre-
dicted value by an amount greater than the tolerance setting.
As Wallclock progresses, the tolerance is purposely reduced
causing a greater likelihood of messages exceeding the tol-
erance. This is done in order to validate the performance
of the system as stress, in the form of greater demand for
accuracy, is increased. Figure 6 shows the prediction er-
ror as a function of Wallclock. The Y-axis is the differ-
ence in the number of packets received versus the number
of packets predicted to have been received. This graph ver-
ifies that the system is producing more accurate predictions
as the demand for accuracy increases. However, the Y-axis
of Figure 7 shows the lookahead decreasing versus Wall-
clock. The expected lookahead time is the difference be-
tween Wallclock and the Local Virtual Time at a particular
node. The demand for greater accuracy reduces the distance
into the future that the system can predict. Finally, in Figure
8, speedup, the ratio of virtual time to Wallclock of the real
system, is shown as a function of Wallclock. The speedup is
reduced as the demand for accuracy is increased. As previ-
ously mentioned, only for purposes of this experiment, the
tolerance is being reduced as Wallclock progresses, causing
the accuracy to increase while loosing performance in terms
of speedup and lookahead.
2.1. AVNMP Overhead
AVNMP has the potential to generate two forms of over-
head, processing overhead and bandwidth overhead. If the
predicted results are within the user specified error toler-
ance and the user fully utilizes the predicted results, then
overhead is at a minimum. The question of overhead versus
benefit becomes one that depends upon the perceived util-
ity of predictive capability and depends significantly upon
the manner and application in which it is used. It is the au-
Figure 4. Tolerance Setting Decreases as Wallclock Increases Thus Demanding Greater Accuracy.
thor’s belief that load and processing prediction are of par-
ticularly great importance in an active network where rout-
ing is based upon not only load, but the processing capabil-
ity required by active applications. In this section, the load
prediction application example is continued with overhead
results displayed in terms of processing time and number of
packets transmitted. The expected Active Network Encap-
sulation Protocol (ANEP) [4] packet size measured during
this test was 1000 bytes.
2.1.1 Task Execution Time and Message Overhead
The task execution time is the Wallclock time the system
spends executing a non-rollback message. It was expected
that task execution time would be essentially constant; how-
ever, it increases in direct proportion to the number of roll-
backs as shown in Figure 9. This is caused by the lack of
fossil collection. The increase in the number of values in
the State Queue is causing access of the State Queue and
Management Information Base (MIB) to slow in proportion
to the queue size. Figure 10 displays the number of virtual
messages versus Wallclock and Figure 11 displays the to-
tal number of anti-messages. This is expected to increase
over time. This value is reset every time the tolerance is
tightened (every 5 minutes in this case).
2.2. AVNMP Robustness
AVNMP is both an active application and an applica-
tion whose purpose is to provide predictive management
of other active applications. As a management applica-
tion it must be robust in the presence of a failing environ-
ment. So far, it has shown to provide graceful predictive
degradation in the presence of dropped packets and bro-
ken links. AVNMP consists of two main types of active
packets: AvnmpLP, which is the Logical Process, and Avn-
mpPacket, which is the virtual message. If an AvnmpLP
packet is dropped, the destination node will not have the
capability to work forward in time or forward virtual mes-
sages. Thus, AVNMP features will not be available on the
node for which AvnmpLP was destined and the accuracy of
other nodes may be reduced. If an AvnmpPacket is dropped
or unexpectedly delayed, accuracy will be reduced because
the State Queues of downstream nodes will lack a predicted
value. However, AVNMP will continue to operate with de-
graded performance. In the next section the role of com-
plexity in understanding prediction is discussed. Ideally, of
course, AVNMP should have predicted the error condition
and taken action to mitigate it. However, control mecha-
nisms have not yet been implemented.
2.3. Networking Viewed Through the Lens of Com-
plexity
AVNMP can provide early warning of potential prob-
lems; however, the identification of a solution and mar-
shaling of automated solution entities within an active net-
work has not yet been fully addressed. This project has
begun to lay the groundwork for such automated compo-
sition of management solutions within an active network
Figure 5. Demand for Greater Accuracy Causes the Proportion of Out-of-Tolerance Messages to
Increase.
[4]. This direction is being carried forward by exploration
of a relatively unexplored area -understanding the benefits
of active networking, Algorithmic Information Theory, and
its close companion, Complexity Theory. To our knowl-
edge, this work is the first to propose and begin inves-
tigation into the newly available processing power of ac-
tive networking through the concept of Complexity and Al-
gorithmic Information (“Streptichrons”) as shown in Fig-
ure 12. Legacy networks, which are today’s passive net-
works, have been designed to optimize transmission of pas-
sive data using bit compression based upon the underlying
notion of Shannon Entropy. AVNMP has shown that ac-
tive networks allow for the possibility of executable mod-
els and that the corresponding information packets might
be best studied with Kolmogorov Complexity as the un-
derlying theory. It is serendipitous that Complexity Theory
has been receiving more attention lately and is making sig-
nificant theoretical progress at the same time that research
into active networking is taking place. Active networks
provide a new paradigm and enhanced capabilities, which,
when combined with ideas from Algorithmic Information
Theory [14], might lead to superior, innovative solutions to
problems of network management. One possible approach
proposes to combine Kolmogorov Complexity with the sci-
ence of Algorithmic Information Theory (sometimes called
Complexity Theory) to build self-managed networks that
draw on fundamental properties of information to identify,
analyze, and correct faults, as well as security vulnerabili-
ties, in a distributed information system [11, 12]. Specif-
ically, we suspect that complexity measures can be used
to detect and analyze problems in a network, and to facili-
tate techniques to remedy network faults. We also envision
that Kolmogorov Complexity can be applied directly to im-
prove the performance of AVNMP. In general, complexity is
not computable; however, the bounds on complexity tighten
continuously as fundamental research in Kolmogorov Com-
plexity progresses.
One potential drawback to AVNMP, gently pointed out
earlier in this paper, is the fact that AVNMP itself consumes
resources in an effort to predict resource usage in a net-
work. Resource consumption by AVNMP is tied directly
to accuracy: higher accuracy costs more in terms of band-
width utilization, associated with simulation rollbacks and
the concomitant transmission of anti-messages. Despite this
relationship, potential exists to nearly reach the theoretical
minimum amount of bandwidth to achieve maximal model
accuracy. This possibility arises because AVNMP consists
of many small, distributed models (each a description of a
theory) that work together in an optimistic, distributed man-
ner via message passing (data). Each AVNMP model can be
transferred, using an active network, as a Streptichron [4],
which is any message that contains an executable model in
addition to data for prediction. Using Streptichrons, the op-
timal mix of data and model can be transmitted to imple-
ment MDL. Achieving maximal model accuracy at minimal
bandwidth provides the best AVNMP accuracy at the least
cost in AVNMP resource consumption.
Other possibilities exist to exploit Kolmogorov Com-
plexity to improve AVNMP performance. For example, one
can apply the MDL technique to the rollback frequency of
all the AVNMP enhanced nodes in a network. A low roll-
back complexity (which suggests a high compressibility in
Figure 6. Predictions Become More Accurate...
the observed data) would indicate patterns in the rollback
behavior that could be corrected relatively easily by tuning
AVNMP parameters. High complexity (low compressibil-
ity) would indicate the lack of any computable patterns, and
would suggest that little performance improvement could
be achieved by simply tuning parameters. Thus, we hy-
pothesize that our tuning gradient should be guided toward
regions of high complexity, which suggests that we can tune
parameters to improve the rollback frequency. The next sec-
tion focuses upon experimental results relating prediction to
complexity gathered from the operation of the AVNMP sys-
tem.
2.4. AVNMP and Kolmogorov Complexity
In AVNMP, information that impacts the network is
transmitted based upon prediction at a low level within the
network. Thus, AVNMP allows experimentation in defin-
ing the boundaries within which active networking is bene-
ficial. In Figure 13 an active and passive form of AVNMP
is represented. The passive case is represented in the up-
per portion of the figure. In the passive case, actual data
(Dx) is observed at the Driving Process. Note that in the
AVNMP architecture, Driving Processes exist at the edge
of the system. They monitor external forces acting upon the
system, such as load, and generate virtual messages, which
are a short-term local prediction about a specific property
such as input load, that are injected into the AVNMP sys-
tem. The Driving Process has a hypothesis that has been
formed about the data; predicted data (Dy) is generated in
the form of static virtual messages. The term static indi-
cates that information content within the message contains
no executable code. The virtual messages are propagated
through the network driving the the system ahead of Wall-
clock. When error in the hypothesis exceeds a preset thresh-
old, AVNMP causes rollbacks to occur in order to adjust for
the inaccuracy. In the lower portion of Figure 13, the hy-
pothesis is included within each packet and is used to en-
code Dy within the code portion of the active packet.
What is the relationship between the estimated operating
hypothesis (He) that can encode an AVNMP packet and He
as the predictor in the Driving Processes? First, they are the
same hypothesis. Second, it has been shown [14] that the
shorter the packet, the better the predictor. Conversely, the
worse the prediction, the longer the E value, where E can
be considered any of the following equivalent names: error,
complexity, or randomness within the AVNMP packet en-
coding. Can Active Virtual Network Management Predic-
tion benefit from the fact that the smallest algorithmic form
is also the most likely predictor of a sequence? This can
come about because Driving Processes and Streptichrons
(active virtual messages anticipating events in the future)
benefit by being both small and accurate as shown in Figure
14. The objective is to increase the rate of convergence of
the predictions held within the State Queue to converge to
the actual value that will occur in the future, and to converge
to that value before it actually exists. Actual and predicted
values within a particular instance of a State Queue were
shown in Figure 2. Let us examine AVNMP results in light
of complexity in more detail in the next section.
Figure 7. ...at the Expense of Lookahead...
2.5. Load Prediction And Complexity In Active Vir-
tual Network Management Prediction
With regard to active packets and information theory,
passive data is simple Shannon compressed data, and active
packets are a combination of data and program code whose
efficiency can be estimated by means of Kolmogorov Com-
plexity. The active network Kolmogorov Complexity esti-
mator is currently implemented as a quick and simple com-
pression estimation method. It returns an estimate of the
smallest compressed size of a string. It is based upon com-
puting the entropy of the weight of ones in a string. Specif-
ically it is defined in Equation 1 where x#1 is the number
of 1 bits and x#0 is the number of 0 bits in the string whose
complexity is to be determined. Entropy is defined in Equa-
tion 2. See [6] for other measures of empirical entropy and
their relationship to Kolmogorov Complexity. The expected
complexity is asymptotically related to entropy as shown in
Equation 3.
Kˆ(x) = l(x)H(
x#1
x#1 + x#0
) + log2(l(x)) (1)
H(p) = −p log2 p− (1.0− p) log2(1.0− p) (2)
H(X) =
∑
l(x)=n
P (X = x)K(x) (3)
Load prediction data sampled from execution of
AVNMP is analyzed relative to several hypotheses. The
goal is to use a simple example to demonstrate the relation-
ship among accuracy of hypotheses, complexity, and com-
pression. The initial hypothesis (He) (regardless of naivete
in choice of hypothesis) is that the data can be characterized
by a simple linear extrapolation based upon the last sam-
pled load values. This is shown in Figure 15 where the gray
boxes are actual load samples and the black stars are pre-
dicted load samples. Note that the predicted load is based
upon a short history shown in the graph as the initial match
between predicted and actual load.
Various enhancements are added to the initial hypothesis
to create new hypotheses for our test. In this specific case,
a running average was used to smooth the data before the
extrapolation. The size of the running average defines a hy-
pothesis. Each enhancement is considered a new hypothesis
(He) in this experiment. In Figure 16, for each He the sum
of the error in predictions is graphed as the gray boxes in
the lower portion of the graph. The compressed size of the
corresponding error is plotted as the black stars in the upper
portion of the figure. Clearly a better hypothesis concern-
ing the origination of the data results in better prediction and
greater compression, while poor hypotheses result in inac-
curate prediction and reduced compression. This provides a
concrete demonstration of the relation between complexity
and prediction accuracy.
A key contribution presented in this paper is the hypothe-
sis and supporting experimental validation that greater com-
plexity results in greater prediction error, and thus greater
likelihood of AVNMP rollback. Load prediction error from
AN-1 (see the experimental configuration shown in Figure
3) within the network is compared with the estimated com-
plexity of the actual load. In Figure 17 the load predic-
tion error is plotted with the estimated complexity versus
Wallclock where values are taken over intervals of the same
length as the Sliding Lookahead Window shown in Table 1.
Larger error, and thus more likely rollback, occurs during
Figure 8. ...and Speedup.
periods of relatively high complexity, while complexity is
low during periods of low prediction error.
As predictions become more inaccurate in AVNMP, vir-
tual messages should slow down, rather than burden the
system with potential rollbacks. Poorly predicted messages
will naturally be larger in their minimum size, which slows
down their rate of propagation in proportion to their inaccu-
racy.
Another issue concerns a mechanism for feedback to the
Driving Process in order to improve He. Such a feedback
mechanism can be based upon input from the complexity
estimate, or minimum encoded packet size, of virtual mes-
sages. The hypothesis is adjusted in a manner that drives the
system towards minimizing encoded virtual message size.
3. Complexity and Assurance
Complexity is useful not only for management predic-
tion and active packet length optimization, but also for secu-
rity. The vulnerability analysis technique presented in this
section takes into account the innovation of an attacker. A
metric for innovation is not new; 700 years ago William
of Occam suggested a technique [10]. The salient point of
Occam’s Razor and complexity-based vulnerability analy-
sis is that the better one understands a phenomenon, the
more concisely the phenomenon can be described. This
is the essence of the goal of science: to develop theories
that require a minimal amount of information to be fully
described. Ideally, all the knowledge required to describe a
phenomenon can be algorithmically contained in formulae,
and formulae that are larger than necessary lack of a full
understanding of the phenomenon. Consider an attacker as
a scientist trying to learn more about his environment, that
is, the target system. Parasitic computing [1] is a literal
example of a scientist studying the operation of a commu-
nication network and utilizing it to his advantage in an un-
intended manner. In Parasitic computing, checksums, addi-
tional overhead supposedly designed to insure the integrity
of the information, are turned against the system and used
to the attacker’s advantage. In fact, because information as-
surance safeguard developers do not yet have a comprehen-
sive conceptual framework in which to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of their safeguards individually or as composites of
safeguards, such scenes are unfortunately all too common.
Safeguard designers must be able to capture and quantify
the mechanism by which an attacker as scientist generates
hypotheses and theorems about a system under attack. The-
orems are attempts to increase understanding of a system
by assigning a cause to an event, rather than assuming all
events are randomly generated. If theorem x, described in
bits, is of length l(x), then a theorem of length l(m), where
l(m) is much less than l(x), is not only much more com-
pact, but also 2l(x)−l(m) times more likely to be the actual
cause than pure chance [10]. Thus, the more compactly a
theorem can be stated, the more likely the theorem is to be
correct. A measure of this compactness is described and
utilized in more detail later in this paper.
Imagine a vulnerability identification process that con-
sists of the following: waiting for an information system
to be attacked, then, assuming it survives and one can de-
tect the attack, analyzing the attack, and if the information
Figure 9. Expected Task Execution Time as a Function of Wallclock.
system is still not compromised, adding this information to
one’s knowledge base. This technique would be unaccept-
able to most people, but it is essentially the technique used
today. Information assurance, and vulnerability analysis in
particular, are hard problems primarily because they involve
the application of the scientific method by a defender to de-
termine a means of evaluating and thwarting the scientific
method applied by an attacker. This self-reference of sci-
entific methods would seem to imply a non-halting cycle
of hypothesis and experimental validation being applied by
both offensive and defensive entities, each affecting the op-
eration of the other. Information assurance depends upon
the ability to discover the relationships governing this cycle
and then quantifying and measuring the progress made by
both an attacker and defender. The salient factor controlling
the paths taken by attacker and defender are governed by
the complexity of the system. Whether such properties are
measurable and how they will behave in a complex system
is a topic of open debate. However, a metric and frame-
work are required for quantifying information assurance in
such an environment of escalating knowledge and innova-
tion. Progress in vulnerability analysis and information as-
surance research cannot proceed without fundamental met-
rics. The metrics should identify and quantify fundamental
characteristics of information in order to guarantee assur-
ance.
A fundamental definition of vulnerability analysis is for-
mulated in this paper based upon attacker and defender as
reasoning entities, capable of innovation. Truly innovative
implementations of attack and defense lead to the evolution
of complexity in an information system. Understanding the
evolution of complexity in a system enables a better under-
standing of where to measure and how to quantify vulnera-
bility and leads towards a calculus of information complex-
ity. The design and implementation of a complexity-based
vulnerability analysis technique is under development as a
tool for automated measurement of information assurance.
The motivation for complexity-based vulnerability analysis
comes from the fact that complexity is a fundamental prop-
erty of information and can be ubiquitously applied. The
presentation and analysis of the Kolmogorov Complexity-
based vulnerability analysis framework must accomplish
several goals. As initially stated, the vulnerability analysis
technique must demonstrate the ability to account for the
innovation of an attacker. The technique should be based
upon fundamental properties of information, rather than
suffer from the combinatorial explosion that occurs when
explicitly examining all possible events generated by spe-
cific systems. The vulnerability results should make intu-
itive sense; vulnerability is reduced by increasing the appar-
ent complexity of access to information from potential at-
tackers while increasing vulnerability for less complicated,
or in some sense shortest paths of access to information.
A topological view of vulnerability can be demonstrated.
This is demonstrated by means of a Kolmogorov Complex-
ity Map (K-Map) in which low complexity paths, which are
likely to be easy for an attacker to follow, are identified. The
concept of a K-Map, or complexity grid, is shown in Figure
18 and the K-Map for a specific example is derived later in
this paper and shown in Figure 29. Figure 18 may itself ap-
pear quite complex upon first glance; however, focus upon
individual parts of the figure in a logical progression. Begin
with the information to be protected that lies at the bottom
of Figure 18. Attacks are illustrated as the thin downward-
Figure 10. Number of Virtual Messages versus Wallclock.
pointing arrows attempting to penetrate the system in order
to manipulate the information. Numerous safeguards, sup-
posedly designed to protect the information, each designed
to mitigate particular types of attack, are shown as barri-
ers with various levels of porosity inserted across the mid-
dle of the figure. The overall complexity of the system is
illustrated by the surface contour located above the infor-
mation and safeguards and is comprised of the complexity
of several entities, namely: the information itself, the com-
plexity of the system in which the information resides and
the complexity of the safeguards. Innovative attacks will
be more likely to successfully penetrate areas of low com-
plexity, easier to comprehend components of the system. In
addition, specific types of attacks, such as Distributed De-
nial of Service (DDoS) will appear as warps in the com-
plexity grid. This is due the inherent system correlation in
DDoS attack-streams. The vulnerability analysis technique
should be applicable in a highly dynamic and amorphous
information environment; an active network environment is
chosen because information can be transmitted through an
active network while its proportion of algorithmic content
varies. In other words, static data or executable code or var-
ious combinations of both can represent information; both
forms of information should have high assurance. The as-
surance of their interaction at a low level within an active
network presents a nice challenge.
Kolmogorov Complexity provides a measure of com-
plexity that can be utilized for vulnerability analysis. Ob-
serve an input sequence at the bit-level and concatenate with
an output sequence at the bit-level. This input/output con-
catenation is observed for either the entire system or for
components of the system. Low complexity input/output
observations quantify the ease of understanding by a poten-
tial attacker. Previous work has demonstrated the use of
Kolmogorov Complexity for Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack detection [13]. Definition 1 explicitly states
the means of measuring the complexity of a system compo-
nent, or protocol interaction, to a potential attacker.
Definition 1:Vulnerability Metric Vulnerability
is inversely proportional to K(x[opstart :
opend])/l(x[opstart : opend]) where opstart is
the bit at which an operation to be discovered within
an information system begins, and opend is the last
bit in an attacker’s observation.
In the remainder of the paper, excerpts from a Mathe-
matica Notebook are included. The excerpts contain code
using common mathematical and programming constructs
and therefore should be intuitively obvious without requir-
ing knowledge specific to Mathematica; any Mathematica
specific details are explained in the text. As a specific ex-
ample of the algorithmic capabilities of active networks,
consider the transmission of an estimate of pi. One could
choose to send pi as an extremely large number of digits;
in contrast, one could send a smaller algorithm capable of
generating pi to an arbitrary number of digits. Consider an
illustration of this concept in more detail. The Mathemat-
ica code, {{#1/#2&}}, {22., 7.}}, represents an unnamed
function that divides the first argument by the second ar-
gument; the function implements 22/7. Consider that the
function ({{#1/#2&}}) and the data ({22., 7.}) remain
unevaluated and are transmitted together. This represents an
active packet; it contains part code and part data. The RUN
function evaluates the function and returns the result; the
Figure 11. Number of Anti-Messages versus Wallclock.
result in this case is static data, a legacy data packet. Math-
ematica code that analyzes the characteristics of algorithmic
and passive information transmission is shown in Figure 19.
The active packet is defined as {{#1/#2&}}, {22., 7.}},
which contains a pair of values and the code necessary to
perform division. The legacy, or passive packet, is defined
as RUN{{#1/#2&}}, {22., 7.}}, which pre-computes
the result of the division and transmits the same informa-
tion in non-algorithmic form. The argument defined as
{{1, 2, 3, 4}, {4, 3, 2, 1}} identifies the links traversed by
the active and passive packets respectively. In this case,
the first packet begins by crossing link one and the second
packet begins by crossing link four. The argument defined
as {100, 100, 1000, 1000} indicates link capacities for links
one, two, three, and four. Thus, the first packet transmits
both code and data that generates the intended information,
while the second packet transmits raw data only. The re-
sult of executing the function below is load and processing
time spent on each link and node for each packet. In Fig-
ure 20, the load induced by sending the estimate of pi using
AnetSim in Figure 20 is plotted for each link. Clearly, the
algorithmic representation of the information is more com-
pact and used less link capacity. In fact, this reinforces the
fact that, by knowing how to compute pi, one could build
a more compact representation; this demonstrates Occam’s
Razor for a useful purpose, information compression. This
has facilitated study of active (algorithmic) versus passive
transmission of information. For example, we allow the ra-
tio of data to code to change for the same information as
the packet traverses the network in a manner that optimizes
both link capacity and node processor speed.
Before continuing with a specific analysis, consider Fig-
ure 24 which shows a topological view of components of a
sample system under analysis. The nodes are active appli-
cation components and the links are security relationships
between the components; the links are quantified using Kol-
mogorov Complexity-based vulnerability analysis. START
is a state that is outside the system that represents the state
of the system before it has been penetrated by an attacker.
3.1. Complexity Surface: The Kolmogorov Com-
plexity Map
The General Electric Corporate Research and Develop-
ment active network test bed implements complexity probes
as part of the active execution environment. The choice was
made to embed the complexity probe in the execution en-
vironment rather than as an active application because it is
necessary to examine the content of active packets before
they reach the execution environment. In the Mathematica
simulation, each component of the active application con-
tains probe-input points through which bit level input and
output is collected. A complexity estimator based upon the
simple inverse compression ratio from Equation 1 is used to
estimate complexity in the density metric. Figure 21 graphs
results from density estimates taken of accumulated input
and output of three separate components of the active net-
work application. The graph shows the complexity of bit-
level input and output strings concatenated together. That
is, every input sequence is concatenated with an output se-
quence and the density of the sequence is recorded at the
bit-level. The input/output concatenation is generated ei-
ther for individual components of the system of for a com-
position of components. If there is low complexity in the
Figure 13. Active versus Passive Form of AVNMP.
input/output observation pairs, then it is likely to be easy
for an attacker to understand the system, as in Definition 1.
The X-axis is the number of input and output observations
concatenated to form a single string of bits. From Figure 21,
it would appear that Component E is most vulnerable due to
its consistently low complexity while Component B appears
to be the least vulnerable due to its larger complexity. These
results make intuitive sense because Component E simply
forwards data without any form of protection while Com-
ponent B adds noise to the data. This vulnerability method
does not take into account whether a component reduces or
increases complexity; in other words whether the change
was endothermic or exothermic complexity. These results
demonstrate how vulnerabilities are systematically discov-
ered using complexity; vulnerabilities can be quantified to
a value within the bounds of the complexity measure error.
In order to develop the Kolmogorov Complexity Map
(K-Map), consider the topology in more detail. Figure 23
shows the resulting densities inserted into a Mathematica
graph object. The graph object allows graph theory re-
lated analyses to be applied. The directed graph in Figure
24 shows the relationship among the vulnerabilities. The
START state, located in the center of the topology, repre-
sents a location outside the system. In Figure 25 a matrix
is generated that shows the cost, in terms of complexity, of
traveling from any node to any other node in the K-Map.
In Figure 26 the function CoordVul computes a maxi-
mum flow through the K-Map graph using the node posi-
tions as shown in Figure 24. Density (K(x)/l(x)) from
Definition 1, acts as a resistance, while its inverse acts as
conductance, supporting insecurity flows as illustrated in
Figure 28. The resulting flow matrix in Figure 27 shows
the maximum flow through each link. Figure 29 shows the
complexity surface of the resulting flows. Higher areas cor-
respond to less vulnerable states, while lower areas corre-
spond to more vulnerable states. Note that in the follow-
ing contour maps, areas of infinite height are simply shown
without a surface. By comparing Figure 24 and Figure 29,
it is apparent that the START state, the infinite mountain in
the center of the topology, is invulnerable, which makes in-
tuitive sense. State E is the weakest individual component
and lowest area on the right side. Note that while State C
cannot be directly attacked from the START state, it can be
attacked via states B and E, located in the upper and lower
right side of the figure respectively, have a relatively inter-
mediate level of vulnerability.
In the insecurity flow contour shown in Figure 30, the
density from Definition 1 is resistance and all possible flows
Figure 17. Estimated Complexity and Error within AVNMP.
from and to every node are summed to obtain an insecu-
rity level. While Node C is assigned infinite complexity as
shown in Figure 29, it actually is the most insecure compo-
nent given that flows exist from Nodes B and E.
4. Summary
A Kolmogorov Complexity estimate was used within the
Active Virtual Network Management Prediction framework
in order to characterize and improve system performance.
The application in this paper focused on an active network
in which information, algorithmic and static, was transmit-
ted to support prediction for active network management.
However, the results are ubiquitously applicable to algorith-
mic transmission of information in general. Kolmogorov
Complexity was experimentally validated as a theory de-
scribing the relationship between algorithmic compression,
complexity, and prediction accuracy within an active net-
work. Next the relationship between complexity and vul-
nerability analysis was proposed. Finally, this work sets the
stage for research into self-composing solutions based upon
Kolmogorov Complexity which will be the focus of the next
phase of this project.
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